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Introduction
Distributive politics is broadly understood as the strategic allo-
cation of public resources with electoral purposes in sight. Distri-
butive politics across government levels is shaped by formal and 
informal arrangements, institutional legacies (Wibbels 2005), and 
redistributive pressures from various regions (Beramendi et al 2017 
Calvo and Moscovich 2017) which distribute power and resources 
within each federation (Weingast 2013). The nested nature of federal 
politics results in a wide range of alliances between government 
levels, all of which affect distribution patterns (Dickovick 2007, 
Fenwick 2009, Borges 2011).
Conventional wisdom acknowledges that presidents favor gover-
nors through different channels in order to gain votes, as well as the 
legislative support that governors can provide, from subnational to 
federal arenas. In this work it is suggested that mayors also matter; 
alignments between presidents and governors alone do not explain 
distributive politics. Distribution patterns of two transfers at the 
municipal level will be explored in order to show that partisan 
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alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other varia-
bles, such mayors being up for reelection) matter for allocation 
decisions.  
Distributive politics matter because, when choosing one level of 
government to distribute resources to (and then choosing certain 
districts and not others within this level of government), presidents 
also affect electoral results and policy outcomes. They affect elec-
toral outcomes, for instance, by making subnational democracy 
more competitive (Borges 2011) or by eroding clientelism (Souza 
2015). More federal resources allocated in certain districts may 
result in higher levels of electoral support for presidents (Hunter 
and Power 2007, Zucco 2008, Bohn 2011). Borges (2011) showed 
that when governors are not aligned with presidents, alternative 
coalitions with mayors can increase electoral competitiveness at the 
state level in Brazil. 
Different strategies such as (re)decentralization or distribution 
patterns of federal resources allow presidents to override governors 
(Fenwick 2009, Moscovich 2012, Dickovick and Eaton 2013). As 
Dickovick and Eaton describe, “national government officials have 
often explicitly designed policy interventions to bolster the status 
of the subnational level they find least threatening (i.e., municipali-
ties), in order to check the power of the subnational level they find 
most threatening (i.e., states, provinces, departments, regions)” 
(2013: 1457). In various countries, municipalities and mayors are 
playing an increasing role as intermediaries in distributive politics 
(Gomez 2003, Dickovick 2007, Fenwick 2009, Zucco 2009, Dicko-
vick and Eaton 2013). This paper investigates which alignments best 
explain the allocation of certain resources at the municipal level. 
In order to understand the puzzle addressed by this work, Brazil 
provides a helpful example. Because states and municipalities are 
both federal entities in Brazil, presidents have the choice to ally with 
one or the other, unfolding different patterns of alliances among 
the three levels of governments. The objective here is to know more 
about distributive politics between government levels in a different 
type of federalism, such as Argentina where, unlike Brazil, only 
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provinces are federal entities and municipalities are subordinate to 
them.4 This means that, first, municipalities depend on provinces for 
their degree of autonomy, institutional design, and territorial size. 
Second, municipalities results in a greater variation  in the patterns 
of electoral and partisan competition. Third, as a result – and this 
is one of the crucial points in this problem – in Argentina there are 
fewer opportunities to override governors to deliver policies and 
resources to municipalities.5 
If municipalities are subordinated to provinces, would the presi-
dent bypass governors in order to distribute federal resources at 
the local level (like they do in Brazil, for instance)? Would they 
take the risk of undermining the power of governors (presidents’ 
main allies) by delivering resources to mayors that are part of the 
opposition? Would the president distribute the same resources to 
each level of government, or would different resources be useful 
to fuel different kinds of alliances?  These questions are important 
because in the new Argentine democracy, electoral competition 
has been shaped in the provincial arena. Governors have been 
key partners to presidents by collecting votes at the subnational 
level and gathering legislative support to pass laws in both federal 
chambers. As a result, they have important bargaining power in 
federal politics (Gonzalez 2016). Unsurprisingly, the key variables 
shaping political agreements – such as revenue sharing, partisan 
competition, and policy distribution – have been studied for their 
effects at the provincial level [i.e. lower levels of democratization of 
certain provinces (Gervasoni 2010), on the influence of governors 
over political carriers (Lodola 2009) and on institutions such as the 
courts (Leiras, et al 2013)] and at the federal level of government 
[malapportionment in federal chambers (Beramendi et al 2017) 
and veto power to pass important laws such as the tax-sharing 
4  We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we stress this counterpoint between Argentina 
and Brazil in order to frame the discussion. 
5  Bland stresses that “provincial administrations generally dominate their lower-level municipal 
counterparts, an important consideration for municipal democracy in Argentina.” (Bland 2011: 86). 
Lorena Moscovich e Valeria Brusco66
regime (Ardanaz et al 2014)].6 As a result, the power and influence 
of governors in Argentina is widely acknowledged. However, little 
is known about how presidents build their alliances with the muni-
cipalities within each province.7 
 To help fill this vacuum, the coexistence of different distributive 
patterns shaped by the presidents’ choices on territorial alliances 
will be explored. It will be also attempted to identify how different 
resources are used to cement them. Using an original dataset with 
17,720 observations of all Argentine municipalities (2,215 listed by 
the Ministry of the Interior) for a period of eight years (2002-2009), 
it is possible to go a step further, scrutinizing the distribution varia-
tion of the Argentine federal government’s assistance programs 
through the lens of political alignments among presidents, gover-
nors, and mayors. The programs chosen are: one workfare program 
and one emergency housing program. Both are allocated with a 
high level of discretion, but they differ in their policy goals. Deci-
sions that deliver resources to certain districts and the amount 
given follow different patterns depending on political and social 
variables, as well as the type of resources delivered.
These findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on the 
relationships between government levels, both in unitary and 
federal countries (O’Neill 2005, Dickovick 2007 and 2014, Borges 
and Lloyd 2016). Particularly, they focus on the role of distributive 
politics in changing the balance of power among government levels 
(Eaton 2004, Fenwick 2009, Souza 2015, Borges 2011) and local 
democratization (Zucco 2009).
6  For a complete literature review of works addressing these issues at the intermediate level of 
government and their influence in federal politics in Argentina, see Ardanaz et al. (2014).
7  Municipal politics have been approached primarily through the lens of clientelistic practices, 
assisting both presidents and governors in the collection of votes across election types (Auyero 
2001, Stokes et al. 2013, Szwarcberg 2013, Zarazaga 2014). A number of qualitative case studies of 
municipalities and local governments study several aspects of politics (i.e. Pirez 1991b, Chiara and 
Di Virgilio 2005, Moscovich 2008). There are also studies on the political economy or distributive 
politics using data from several municipalities for just one year or within a few provinces (Porto 
and Porto 2000, Nazareno et al. 2007, Stokes et al. 2013). Lodola (2005) includes mayors’ parties to 
explain distribution patterns of a workfare program; however, the dependent variable considered is 
expenditure by province. To the best of our knowledge there are no time series empirical analyses, 
even on federal expenditures, for all Argentine municipalities. 
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The focus lies on the resources and opportunities that create 
various patterns of distributive politics at the municipal level. 
What makes this strategic allocation possible is the availability of 
resources that presidents can deliver with discretion. This discretion 
allows presidents to use resources in order to seek support given 
different incentives – for instance when a president seeks different 
partners to strengthen his position, as president Nestor Kirchner 
did when he got to office with a weak electoral performance. Section 
III explains why partisan alignments with governors and mayors 
are considered a good proxy for the diversity of alliances among 
government levels. As  section IV explores, governors are presi-
dents’ main partners in federal countries, but the alliances between 
presidents and governors explain only a part of the funds delivered 
to municipalities. In Argentina, mayors also play an important role 
in federal politics, but municipalities are subordinated to provinces, 
presenting an interesting puzzle worth analyzing. Section IV zooms 
in on the determinants of these distribution patterns . In section 
IV it is developed the hypotheses regarding the influence of presi-
dents’ alliances with governors and mayors, as well as the type of 
resources delivered in distributive politics at the municipal level. 
Section V presents the variables to be examined, and Section VI 
shows that distribution does vary according to partisan alignments 
among different levels of government. Mixed evidence regarding 
the second hypothesis on distribution patterns differing by types of 
resources can be found. In section VII lies the final remarks.
New tools and opportunities for distributive politics among 
government levels
Distributive politics, understood as the strategic allocation of 
resources with political purposes, relies on the discretion with 
which these resources can be distributed among a set of potential 
beneficiaries. For instance, formula grants give incumbents little 
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flexibility and discretion.8 Working with these grants would offer 
little information about the strategic allocation of these resources. 
The president has access to federal resources that can be delivered 
with discretion across government levels, such as social safety net 
programs (workfare programs, social assistance programs, emer-
gency housing programs and, sometimes, conditional cash trans-
fers). As a result, the presidents’ choices are explored by studying 
the distribution of two different federal transfers from social 
programs. The distribution of these two programs at the municipal 
level in Argentina in the period from 2002 to 2009 is the dependent 
variable. 
Social assistance policies have been used as proxies for the federal 
government’s coalition-building strategies when the federal gover-
nment distributes these funds in favor of one level over another 
(Fenwick 2009), such as municipalities (Dickovick, 2007). In 
addition, resources delivered at the subnational level can be used to 
strengthen the federal government’s position through other subna-
tional units (Dickovick and Eaton, 2013). In other cases, resources 
delivered with high discretion – such as cash transfers – are backing 
the partisan strategy of central government in order to build the 
basis for its electoral success (Hunter and Power 2007). 
In Argentina, changes in social assistance since the mid-1990s 
(Lodola, 2005) , particularly since the 2000s, have created new 
tools for presidents to seek votes at the municipal level. Social assis-
tance programs, workfare programs, and, to a lesser extent, condi-
tional cash transfers can be distributed with discretion, allowing 
the federal government to reach both governors and mayors (and 
voters through them). These social policies make coalitions feasible, 
easier to fuel and, as a result, attractive. Nazareno et al. (2007) 
show how workfare program funds are delivered to municipalities 
8  The Coparticipación (the federal formula grant tax-sharing regime) is the main source of transfers 
from the federal government to the provinces. Several works suggest its high complexity; the 
regime of exceptions and the margin for political bargaining subvert its automatic allocation of 
resources, giving the president a certain degree of discretion, and thus affecting its distribution 
(Porto and Sanguinetti 2001, Tommasi 2002). Unlike Brazil, there are not fixed transfers of the 
tax-sharing regime to municipalities.
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targeting swing districts, and are more effective than public employ-
ment (patronage) in collecting votes.9 With a representative sample 
of 127 municipalities, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) suggests that mayoral 
intervention in the distribution of welfare benefits – alongside the 
lack of opposition – promotes clientelism in Argentina. Overall, 
for presidents, the stability of political networks in municipalities 
increases the opportunity to control voters’ behavior and demons-
trates the importance of smaller districts in vote seeking strategies. 
Although throughout the years Peronism split definitively, during 
this period we analyze Kirchner’s faction was one more within the 
party.  In other words we analyze the Frente para la Victoria as one 
more faction within the peronist party,  and not as a different elec-
toral alternative.10 Nestor Kirchner supported several candidates 
running for the same positions in different government levels, even 
when these candidates did not belong to the President’s electoral 
coalition. Moreover, these new territorial agreements also included 
politicians from his main opposition parties (even in districts with 
core allies as incumbents), social organizations, and also mayors. 
Before Kirchner, bypassing allied governors to reach mayors was 
rare (except in the most populated counties in the Buenos Aires 
metropolitan area).11 
The diversification of allies at the subnational level was mostly a 
result of Kirchner’s political weakness during his first years of gover-
nment, but the lack of trust in his own party partners also made 
such diversification necessary. Thanks to its sustained growth and 
9  The 2007 election saw 56% of municipalities reelect their mayors.  
10  Although throughout the years Peronism split definitively, during this period we analyze Kirchner’s 
faction was one more within the party.  In other words we analyze the Frente para la Victoria as one 
more faction within the Peronist party, and not as a different electoral alternative. 
11  The Argentine federal government started to intervene in the most populated municipalities when 
the constitutional reform of 1994 permitted direct votes to elect presidents. Ardanaz et al. suggest: 
“There are also instances of the president trying to circumvent the province and going directly 
to the lower level of government, the municipalities. But even that channel is conditional on the 
strength of the grip of the governor. If the majors of most important municipalities are aligned 
with the governor, such ‘bridging’ will not take place.” (2014: 42). While this was the main pattern 
in the past, presidents now also bridge governors in municipalities aligned with them.  
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resource availability,12 the federal government was able to unfold 
a series of social programs targeting the poor at the county level, 
becoming part of the regional trend of implementing non-contri-
butory tools for social assistance.
Determinants of distribution
It is suggested that distributive politics are conditioned by the 
use that presidents give to these programs: to cement alliances 
with (or to reward) mayors and governors. This does not mean 
that these policies are used only for electoral purposes. The policies 
have specific aims, such as to alleviate people’s needs and to achieve 
certain policy designs. Everything matter in order to understand 
which levels of government benefit most from these payments. 
Political, partisan and programmatic concerns explain why muni-
cipalities get these programs, as well as why some of them get more 
than others. 
It is explored, specifically, the influence of partisan alignments 
between presidents and governors or mayors in distribution patterns 
. Partisan alignments across government levels are dummy varia-
bles combining all possible alignments between mayors, governors 
and presidents. It is expected a variation in patterns of revenue 
distribution depending on these alignments, the main independent 
variables.
In this sense, the second generation of studies in fiscal federa-
lism underscore how relations among government levels shape 
distributive politics and affect, for instance, local development. 
In the words of Weingast (2015), this is important in developing 
countries where local public goods are financed by federal resources 
delivered with high discretion. These resources are used as a way to 
compel citizens to vote for the political party that distributes them. 
12   Several economic policies increased the access of the federal executive branch to funds without 
the control of Congress or governors. Some of these measures were linked to the nationalization 
of the pension system in 2008. In addition, an estimated 30 billion dollars and the reform of the 
Central Bank Charter in 2012 allowed the federal government to use monetary reserves for up to 
12% of the monetary base with financial aims. In addition, the federal government controls 70% 
of soybean export taxes.
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According to Weingast, the threat of withdrawal if they change their 
vote leads citizens to support the incumbent party. 
Alignments explain distribution, from federal to subnational 
governments. Distribution guarantees subnational governments 
the resources to fuel local control. Mayors and governors must 
tightly control local politics in order to give presidents the poli-
tical inputs that local politics can provide to federal politics (votes, 
candidates, policy networks, and legislative support). Evidence from 
Brazil suggests that presidents fuel coalitions by “building strategies 
in settings characterized by a persistent coincidence between the 
parties and/or coalitions occupying at the same time the federal 
and state governments” (Borges 2011: 32).13 This party alignment 
guarantees governors access to resources that finance their political 
activities – i.e. patronage (Murillo and Calvo, 2004) – and deliver 
particularized favors and resources to buy votes for elections. Party 
alignment helps to prevent the opposition from building alterna-
tive coalitions with the president (Borges, 2011). The absence of 
these alignments means that governors risk the rollback of their 
monopoly over resources. 
One of the tools that presidents have to override non-allied 
governors is to deliver resources to municipalities, thus undermi-
ning their power (Fenwick, 2009). For mayors, alignments with 
successful presidential candidates allow them to avoid electoral 
defeat when facing opposing governors (Borges 2011, Borges and 
Llloyd, 2016).14 Freille and Capello (2014) verified a negative corre-
lation between locally-collected resources and reelection at the 
municipal level. They suggest that the lower the weight of locally-
-collected resources in the municipal budget, the higher the chances 
of mayoral reelection, and that locally-collected resources have a 
negative correlation with the success of the incumbent party. Carlos 
Gervasoni reaches similar conclusions at the provincial level when 
analyzing the effects of federal transfers to governors. In both works 
13  For the use of political alignments in distributive politics, see Niedzwiecki (2015).
14  Simultaneous elections result in a coattail effect where mayors opposing successful governors or 
presidents are prone to failure (Carson and Roberts 2013, Meredith 2011, Samuels 2003). 
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the logic is similar. Both for mayors and governors, counting on 
resources without paying the cost of collecting them reduces the 
incentives for citizens to try to affect how the government spends 
its money. On the other hand, it gives more resources to politicians 
that can be used for electoral  purposes. Boulding and Brown (2013) 
put forth the same conclusion: they suggest that more resources 
predict lower levels of electoral competition and higher levels of 
turnout at the municipal level. Using evidence on social spending 
in Brazil, they find a positive correlation between more money 
being available for mobilizing voters and higher margins of victory 
for incumbents. Counting on more or fewer resources affects the 
chances of winning or losing votes. The federal government knows 
this; therefore, distributive politics follow certain patterns in order 
to reward core or swing governors and mayors depending on their 
strategies. These mechanisms account for the inclusion of a number 
of variables, which serve as proxies for the competitiveness level 
of municipalities and provinces. Mayors’ reelection, margin of 
victory (provincial), malapportionment (provincial), and effective 
number of parties (provincial) are  control variables used to assess 
this control over local politics and are explained below in section 
V. In this section, it will be explained the nature and use of the 
distributive politics of workfare programs in relation to partisan 
alignments; then, in the following section, there is a zoom in on the 
determinants of these distribution patterns. 
Explaining distribution to subnational districts: the choice 
for governors and mayors 
As mentioned above, in Argentina,  unlike Brazil, municipalities 
are not autonomous. They depend on governors,  therefore presi-
dents see governors and mayors as “asymmetric partners.” Given 
this different status as federal entities and the power of governors, 
one wonders whether  mayors also matter for distribution decisions. 
Argentina provides an ideal setting to study these different coalition 
patterns. It is a federation with one federal district, 23 provinces, 
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and more than 2,200 municipalities, and for reasons explained 
below, both governors and mayors matter in federal politics.
Why are presidents’ relationships to governors and mayors so 
different? Presidents build different alliances to maximize political 
outcomes from each district. Both governors and mayors (from 
the most populated districts) can help presidents gain votes and 
mobilize people to rally support for the national government’s 
causes.15 
Governors oversee politicians’ careers and instruct legislators 
from their districts to pass certain laws in national chambers (De 
Luca 2008, Ardanaz et al., 2013). Mayors usually lack this influence 
on political careers, but they can become legislators – or other 
prominent figures in federal politics – themselves. Municipalities 
are a necessary step in a politicians’ careers, before (Lodola 2009) 
or after (Samuels ,2003) politicians’ tours of duty in the national 
chambers or cabinet. 
Electoral mobilization relies on governors and their control over 
provincial party branches (De Luca 2008). They facilitate parties’ 
access to public funds for organizational purposes, such as money 
and logistics for electoral campaigns or public employments for 
party members (Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Governors remain in 
power by reallocating discretionary federal funds to build their 
patronage base16 and tightly controlling several aspects of public life 
and of the provincial economic realm (Gervasoni, 2010, Behrend, 
2011). Governors are, thus, identified as responsible for the fate of 
their provinces (Gonzalez 2016). However, at the same time, the 
provinces depend on federal resources and experience high vertical 
15  Several works account for the blurred boundaries between policy delivery and support-rallying or 
vote seeking (Auyero 2001, Stokes et al. 2013, Szwarcberg 2013, Zarazaga 2014, Camp and Szwarcberg 
2015). However, our central focus is to explore patterns of distribution emerging from presidents’ 
choices. It is beyond the scope of this work to identify how these funds are used once governors 
and mayors receive them. Thus, we adopt the concern of Gonzalez (2017), who suggests that 
social spending must not be approached only through the lens of clientelism, and that patterns of 
distribution themselves are worth considering. This is particularly due to the difficulty of observing 
the real effect of money delivered on voting behavior and the more general complexity involved 
in measuring clientelism (2017: 94). 
16  Governors belonging to the president’s party receive additional funds, as occurs in Brazil (Borges 
2011).
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fiscal imbalance (Jones et al. 1998, Meloni, 2010), making federal 
resources crucial for governors.  
Municipalities in Argentina are subordinated to provinces 
(Bland, 2011) and lack self-generated policies, tools and resources, 
making them dependent on the provincial and federal governments. 
However, this does not mean that they do not matter; they contri-
bute with their own control over local politics. Mayors distribute 
funds at the municipal level through party machines and brokers 
to mobilize voters for elections and rally support for presidents 
(Szwarcberg, 2013). However, municipalities lack constitutionally-
-guaranteed revenues.17 In addition, they can only collect limited 
taxes, which vary across districts. The paradox of local mobilization 
in Argentine municipalities is that mayors lack resources to fuel 
their party machines, creating a mutual dependency upon federal 
transfers. The government level that distributes federal grants exerts 
greater influence upon local politics than other levels of government 
that do not distribute these grants (Weitz-Schapiro, 2012). 
Although governors are often responsible for resolving people’s 
needs with specific policies or employing people in the provincial 
state apparatus, mayors are responsible for street-level bureaucrats 
who ensure that federal and provincial policies reach their intended 
beneficiaries (Garay, 2007, Fenwick, 2010). Many policies (local, 
provincial, or federal) are delivered to citizens at the municipal 
level; thus, municipal collaboration can help the federal govern-
ment pursue its policy goals (Fenwick, 2009). In fact, mayors are in 
the best position to help the federal government deliver conditional 
cash transfers (Fenwick, 2009), thanks to their closer access to 
citizens and ability to identify potential beneficiaries (Weitz-Scha-
piro, 2012). Therefore, mayors often facilitate outcomes such as vote 
seeking, candidate selection, policy delivery, political mobilization, 
and social peace,  regardless of the governors.
17  While for Fenwick (2009) institutional and economic autonomy is crucial in order to explain why 
presidents override governors in the delivery of social programs, in Argentina lower levels of municipal 
autonomy render this explanation unsuitable.
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Governors and mayors contribute with the necessary political 
inputs to federal politics and the president may have no incentive or 
choice to remove them. However, when they have money to distri-
bute with discretion, presidents do not allocate it uniformly within 
all provinces and its respective municipalities. There are differences 
in the money allocated to different provinces and, within them, to 
different municipalities. These alliances require the use of specific 
resources. 
Therefore the hypotheses to be tested are: 
1) Governors are presidents’ main partners at the subnational 
level. However, it is suggested that presidents also need 
mayoral collaboration, and similar to the provincial level, 
this collaboration is fueled by distributive politics. There-
fore, beyond governors, alignments between presidents and 
mayors in addition to mayoral reelection (as a proxy of the 
control that mayors have over their territories) will be impor-
tant to identify the determinants of distributive politics. 
2) Given the patterns of alliances that explain distribution to 
provinces and  municipalities within those, different types 
of transfers allow presidents to build alliances with different 
subnational political players. 
2.a) It is also suggested that highly individualized transfers are 
preferable for delivery to mayors, who are able to control 
their districts and approach citizens on an individual basis. 
These programs do not require any specific expertise or 
administrative state capacity for their reallocation.
2.b) Public works  such as infrastructure, roads, and housing 
are used to reward governor support, and governors prefer 
them  to bolster their image with citizens. 
Political and social determinants of distributive patterns 
with mayors and governors
In this section, the focus lies on the operationalization of varia-
bles, along with their supporting data. Tables with descriptive 
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statistics and a complete list of variables with their definitions and 
sources can be found in Appendices A and B. 
Dependent variables
The dependent variables consist of two different federal social 
programs distributed in Argentine municipalities. The president 
has access to federal resources that can be delivered with discretion, 
such as social safety net programs (workfare programs, social assis-
tance programs, housing emergency programs and, sometimes, 
conditional cash transfers) across various levels of government. 
Discretion allows them to build alliances with different players. 
Neither provinces nor municipalities can ask for exclusivity in their 
relations with the federal government. This means that governors 
cannot prevent mayors from receiving resources as well. The depen-
dent variable, then, is whether a municipality received resources 
from these programs (models 1-4) and the log of the total amount 
received by a municipality from one of these programs’ transfers 
(models 5 -6).18
The first program considered is the Emergency Housing Program 
(EH), created in 2003. In order to be aware of the program, beneficia-
ries had to keep some kind of contact with municipal governments 
or political networks. Second, each beneficiary needed to become 
a member of (or create) a cooperative, with which he or she would 
continue to work under the program for an extended period of 
time. Members received a salary for their work, resources for basic 
supplies, and had to coordinate the administration of the funds for 
building materials with their respective municipalities.19 The EH 
program had direct and indirect beneficiaries. Direct beneficia-
ries were the members of the cooperatives (86,400 members were 
employed). The indirect beneficiaries (4,338,000 people) consisted 
of all people living in the neighborhoods that benefited from cons-
truction work (data provided by functionaries from the Ministry of 
18  See below for further details about the models.
19  Although from these last two features, one can expect this program to be useful to fuel alliances 
with mayors, we will see that presidents prefer to deliver them to both  governors and mayors.
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Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services in 2010). Various 
criteria informed the allocation of houses and resources. Sometimes 
there was a waitlist for a house in the municipality, while in other 
cases, members of cooperatives (and/or wider social organizations 
holding the cooperatives) had priority in the assignment of new 
houses. 
The second program is the PJJH ( household heads program, or 
Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar), which was created in 2002 and soothed 
social discontent after the 2001-2002 crisis. Program implementa-
tion was advertised nationwide, and requirements to qualify were 
widely known: only unemployed people with children under 18 
years old were eligible. It reached a great number of people and 
enrollment lasted just two weeks in May 2002. There was little 
room for discretion: all eligible people joined and local councils, 
under the control of civil society, monitored its distribution at the 
municipal level. After ceasing the enrollment , one could only  join 
the program if someone else dropped out. Later on, it turned out 
to be a helpful tool for discretionary allocation used by municipal 
governments and social organizations (such as ‘Piqueteros’). Both 
were also responsible for monitoring beneficiaries for the number 
of weekly hours they had to work in order to continue receiving the 
benefit. The number of beneficiaries decreased over time as people 
changed workfare programs [for instance, 44.8% moved to another 
program called Familias (MTSS 2009)] or found jobs. Enrollment 
dropped from almost 2,000,000 beneficiaries in 2003  to around 
700,000 in 2008 (MTSS 2009). 
These two programs differed in goals, scope and  allocation 
methods. Their scope and timing moved in opposite directions. 
People living in 91% of the municipalities in the database received 
PJJH and just 8% received EH. While the PJJH was at its highest 
enrollment at the beginning of the period studied, EH enrollment 
increased over the years. It is expected that the president would 
deliver the policies more appreciated by each partner (governors or 
mayors). The fact that the programs chosen differed in several ways 
will allow us to test these hypotheses.  At the same time, they are 
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also comparable because of two important coincidences: in almost 
all cases the programs were transferred from the federal executive 
to beneficiaries at the municipal level, and beneficiaries needed to 
be connected to territorial partisan networks to take part on EH or 
PJJH. 
Independent variables 
For the models, two different groups of independent variables 
were employed. The first group consists of partisan alignments 
between government levels (whether mayors, governors and 
presidents belong to the same party or not), for models 2, 4 and 6. 
They are used as proxy for these twofold distributive patterns with 
mayors and governors. Partisan alignments across government 
levels make up a group of dummy variables combining all possible 
alignments among mayors, governors and presidents. It is expected 
to find a variation in patterns of revenue distribution depending 
on these alignments. In some models the alignment was replaced 
for a second group of variables – mayors’ parties – in order to 
understand how these patterns are affected by mayors’ partisanship, 
beyond their alignment with presidents (models 1, 3 and 5). 
Political Control Variables 
Mayors’ reelection, margin of victory (provincial), malappor-
tionment (provincial) and effective number of parties (provincial) 
are control variables used to assess this control over local politics. 
The influence of reelection in distribution patterns was tested. The 
mayors’ names in four different elections were used in order to 
assess reelection trends (even if they changed party). Reelection can 
be considered a measure of incumbent advantage, explaining distri-
butive politics in favor of mayors who are able to keep their power. 
If reelection increases the chances of getting money, as well as the 
quantity of money given, then presidents should reward successful 
mayors who keep a tight control over their networks.
Other control variables assess competitiveness in gubernatorial 
elections. Governors’ margin of victory over challengers in previous 
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elections and effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979) running in provincial elections provide valuable information 
on the level of provincial polities’ competitiveness. In addition, 
this influences the odds of getting workfare programs – and the 
amount of funds received – for each municipality. Another political 
control variable is malapportionment. Argentina is the federation 
with the highest rate of imbalance between numbers of voters per 
seats in chambers (Samuels and Snyder 2001); this has a number of 
consequences for coalition building and legislative support seeking. 
Governors of poorer and less populated areas can be “cheaper” 
to persuade [what Gibson and Calvo (2000) called the peripheral 
coalition]. Transfers from a small housing program can be seen 
as marginal or less valuable for governors. As Lee (2003) suggests, 
a smaller transfer can be more visible and have more impact in a 
smaller district. These districts are also likely to engage in federal 
coalitions and Gordin (2010) shows that presidents use discretio-
nary funds and bilateral agreements (fiscal pacts) to assert their 
veto power in federal chambers. 
Socio–Demographic Control Variables 
Since both revenues used as dependent variables were meant 
to target the poor, social variables were included in the models 
as controls. These control variables allow one to assess the weight 
that programmatic distribution has vis a vis tactical allocation. 
Spending is related to political competition and programmatic 
considerations as well (Gonzalez, 2017), since, for instance, poorer 
areas are more sensitive to  patronage and clientelism. Unfortuna-
tely there is no information available at the municipal level for all 
the years covered by this study ; the Census information for poverty 
(log of people with basic unsatisfied needs) in all municipalities and 
lagged provincial unemployment rates for all the years in the series 
were employed. Workfare programs tend to be allocated to people 
who most need them;  it can be verified that the distribution of 
social cash transfers and public works for the poor are determined 
Lorena Moscovich e Valeria Brusco80
by social variables.20 However, since there are more poor people 
than resources to be delivered, evidence demonstrates that even 
among the very poor, discretion favors clientelistic distribution 
on a political basis (Giraudy, 2007).  This is due not only due to 
clientelism, but also to the presidents’ objective to persuade more 
discontented voters as a result of their precarious situation (Zucco, 
2008). Therefore, it is suggested that high levels of fiscal imbalance, 
both at the provincial and municipal level, make federal resources 
more valuable, particularly in less developed regions. For these 
reasons, distribution patterns of workfare programs are expected to 
be affected by social variables as well. 
Lastly,  the population log was controlled (at the municipal level 
for 2001). The literature does not agree on the potential effects of 
population in vote seeking and distributive politics. This is because, 
on one hand, more populated districts may seem more valuable for 
vote seeking and, on the other hand, smaller and less populated 
districts can also be attractive because they are over-represented 
and cheaper to include in an alliance (Gibson and Calvo 2000). 
Some research has shown that smaller localities are more prone to 
the clientelistic control by brokers. In the next section  the results 
and its interpretation are disclosed. 
Data and Models
In federal countries, presidents need both mayors and gover-
nors, and they use specific policies to build alliances with both of 
them. Presidents can use different alignments in order to distri-
bute different types of funds. This statement will be explored by 
using an original dataset with 17,720 observations of all Argentine 
municipalities (2,215 listed by the Ministry of the Interior) for a 
20  In Brazil, for instance, the political distribution of conditional cash transfers among supporters at 
the municipal level did not hinder the achievement of this policy outcome (Zucco 2008, Fenwick 
2009).
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period of eight years (2002-2009)21 with the intention of identifying 
distribution patterns of federal revenues at the municipal level. For 
each municipality we use the  amount of money received from the 
following two different revenue sources – a workfare program and 
a housing program – and a number of political and social variables 
(all described above).
 First,  four logistic regressions for cross-sectional time series 
data were specified and then the above-mentioned revenues were 
assessed (models 1-4). In these models, the dependent variables are 
two dichotomous variables that assume the value of 1 if a municipa-
lity in a particular year obtains a transfer from the PJJH or EH and 
0 otherwise22. 
Then,  a general square regression for panel data was performed 
to understand why some municipalities receive more of one these 
transfers (models 5-6). In these models, the dependent variable is 
a continuous variable consisting of the total money from the PJJH 
given to each municipality each year, logged.23 
The main independent variables are all possible combinations 
of party alignments among the three government levels (Models 2, 
4 and 6). Different government levels were considered as aligned 
when belonging to the same political party or electoral coalition 
at election time (Borges 2011). In order to address the effects of 
partisanship beyond alignments in models 1, 3 and 5,  mayors’ party 
21   Néstor Kirchner took office in 2003, but  2002 data was employed as well because the PJJH started 
that year. After the 2001 crisis, interim president Eduardo Duhalde mentored Kirchner. Kirchner 
was Duhalde’s presidential candidate and some members of Duhalde’s cabinet remained in office 
after 2003.
22  Where X is a vector of control variables: reelected mayor, margin of victory, ENCP, malapportionment, 
provincial unemployment (lagged), poverty, population, other party mayor, provincial party mayor, 
Peronist party mayor, and UCR party mayor. 
23  Our main concern is what makes a municipality eligible for a president to deliver money. For this 
reason, both programs were regressed with logits in order to explore why a municipality was 
chosen.  However, since the PJJH went to 91% of municipalities, it was also necessary to provide 
further details on what make a municipality get more resources than others. Therefore, the PJJH 
was also regressed using general square regression. The model produces estimators that were 
unaffected by autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. This is useful when datasets have fewer time 
components than districts, provinces, and municipalities (Gonzalez 2017). 
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were used instead of party alignments. For all models, random 
effects wee employed.24 
Results 
The results show that presidential alliances with mayors and 
governors coexist. However, the latter remain more influential in 
the decisions of tactical allocations of federal resources, which is 
consistent with the asymmetric nature of the partnership: governors 
are more powerful than mayors and bring presidents more political 
inputs. Social variables also have a positive and significant influence 
on the distribution of one of the workfare programs analyzed. 
Funds go to municipalities with poorer people (Zucco, 2008). But, 
since there are fewer resources than eligible people within the poor, 
political variables also intervene in its distribution. Within those 
political variables, alignments among government levels are more 
influential than competitiveness in the last gubernatorial elections, 
malapportionment at the provincial level, or the party to which the 
mayor belongs.
Given the array of political coalitions presidents may build 
in multilevel polities, they try to maximize the returns of their 
investments in both municipalities and provinces. Both alignments 
between president-governor and president-mayor alliances signi-
ficantly explain the allocation of the housing program in question 
(models 1 and 2). However, governors play a stronger role in the 
municipal attainment of this resource. This makes sense for two 
reasons: first, governors play a role as counterparts of the federal 
government in public works, and second, these governors get 
rewards from the visibility of these public works [not excludable 
goods (Calvo and Murillo, 2013)] at the provincial level. 
Alignments with the president’s party significantly explain the 
distribution of this program. If one considers the mayor’s party 
24  The models were implemented both with random and fixed effects. For both specifications, 
coefficients kept their signs. However,  the models with random effects were chosen because 
some variables did not change in time and were dropped when assessed with fixed effects. For 
the advantages of using random effects and its application to Generalized Least Squares (GLS), 
see Williams (2017) and Gonzalez (2017). 
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alone without the alignments (model 1), the influence is weaker.25 
Mayors’ alliances with presidents increase the chances of getting the 
EH by 1.5 times. However, when governors share the party with the 
president, the chances of getting the EH are 3 times higher. Munici-
palities from the FPV had more chances of receiving these workfare 
programs. Mayors from other parties and particularly from the 
UCR had significantly lower chances of getting the EH.
Beyond political variables, a number of demographic and social 
variables capture the balance between programmatic and distri-
butive politics. How much do social indicators affect patterns of 
distribution vis a vis other political variables? Population has a 
very small and negative influence when political alignments are 
included (models 1 and 2). When included, political variables (such 
as alignments between presidents and governors) capture the effects 
of sociodemographic variables, such as population, on a muni-
cipality’s likelihood of receiving this program. It can be inferred 
that this housing program is delivered with political, rather than 
programmatic, purposes. 
Poverty has a small influence on the chances that a municipality 
receives the EH. The coefficient for poverty is similar to that for 
political alignments. If governors are so influential in the allocation 
of the EH to a given municipality, why do mayors (and which 
mayors) also matter? Thanks to this program, unemployed workers 
are organized in cooperatives to build houses for the poor. Bene-
ficiaries of the housing program receive a salary for construction 
work and once the houses are finished, they are given to people 
who lack proper housing (whether or not they are members of the 
cooperatives). On one hand, public works are useful for governors 
to claim credit, and the province has the administrative capacity to 
help beneficiaries access construction materials. However, county-
-level personal networks managed by mayors remain crucial in 
its implementation, since they help federal government identify 
cooperative members and housing recipients. 
25  This is consistent with Gonzalez’s (2017) findings about the weak influence of governors’ parties 
in determining social spending at the provincial level. 
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In the same vein as previous findings in the literature (Nazareno 
et al. 2007, Calvo and Murillo 2013, Posner and Kramor 2013), it is 
suggested that each transfer can serve different goals, particularly 
those aimed at building a variety of coalitions with mayors and 
governors. Since the president has enough resources for different 
allies, he or she has no incentive to leave aside any intermediary 
in subnational territories. Instead, presidents can choose which 
transfer to deliver in order to fuel a particular coalition, overriding 
governors if necessary. Public works are highly visible for all voters 
of the province, whether or not they are the direct beneficiaries of 
a particular workfare program; this housing program is useful to 
cement alliances with governors and also (to a lesser extent) with 
mayors.
Table 1 - Municipalities Receiving Federal Transfers for Housing and Workfare Programs
Variables 1 EH 2 EH 3PJJH 4 PJJH
























Reelected Mayor 0.2206179 0.0122117 0.4096745 1.054066***
(-0.1546) (-0.1411) (-0.4412) (0.3832)
Margin of Victory 0.0162436*** 0.0092529** -0.0365913* -0.0330705**
(-0.0048) (-0.0045) (-0.0209) (-0.0149)
ENCP -0.1402742 0.0873193 -2.026349*** -1.838069***
(-0.1427) -(0.1329) (-0.7770) (-0.5242)
Malapportionment -1.41597*** -1.449142*** -2.472801** -3.324537***
(-0.3247) (-0.3072) (-10.347) (-0.9896)
Provincial unemployment (lagged) 0.0071549 0.0258674 -0.0119932 -0.0460234
(-0.0310) (-0.0301) (-0.0813) (-0.0721)
Poverty 1.926839*** 2.024774*** 5.8851*** 3.96413***
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(-0.2423) (-0.2349) (-0.7016) (-0.9973)
Population -0.3863056* -0.5391375*** 2.09829*** 4.162032***
(-0.2144) (-0.2065) (-0.7092) (-10.398)









(-0.3267) (-12.008)  










Year 2003 -4.900659*** -5.36451*** -0.4423635 -0.996553*
(-0.5109) (-0.4872) (-0.6805) (-0.5784)
Year 2004 -3.005545*** -3.366439*** -0.7505732 -0.7293322
(-0.3605) (-0.3218) (-0.6837) (-0.5937)
Year 2005 -1.608541*** -2.146501*** -0.9510846 -1.259.131
(-0.3351) (-0.2906) (-0.8245) (-0.7823)
Year 2006 -0.7215922*** -1.036442*** -1.94352* -2.413602**
(-0.2656) (-0.2230) (-10.480) (-0.9548)
Year 2007 -0.0963235 -0.0131609 -2.983259*** -3.099258***
(-0.2049) (-0.1694) (-0.8090) (-0.7017)
Year 2008 -0.2051158 -0.3075989** -2.880066*** -3.234865***





Constant -11.32021*** -12.09057*** -5.134.971 -15.27326***
(-0.9902) (-0.9557) (-41.490) (-44.284)
Log(Variance)
Constant 2.249149*** 2.261603*** 4.924474*** 4.860166***
(-0.1187) (-0.1136) (-0.1084) (-0.1071)
Observations 10484 11791 12143 13559
Note: Estimates for time-series cross-sectional panel data explaining federal transfers to municipalities by year. Dependent variable 
in models 1 and 2 takes the value of 1 if a municipality received resources from the Argentine federal housing program (EH) and 
0 otherwise. Dependent variable in models 3 and 4 measures total transfer (log) for the workfare program Jefes y Jefas (PJJH)s. 
Random effects by municipality. Standard errors in parentheses.
* = p value less/equal to 0,10.
** = p value less/equal to 0,05.
*** = p value less/equal to 0,01.
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While the president’s decision to build EH alliances with gover-
nors and mayors matters, the distribution of the PJJH (models 
3 and 4) follows a different pattern in which governors are the 
preferred intermediaries, which does not confirm the expectation 
regarding this transfer. At first glance, this seems surprising due to 
the individualized nature of this workfare program. When partisan 
alignments across government levels are introduced (model 4), 
alliances between governors and the president increase the chances 
of getting the PJJH by 6 times.
However, while partisan alignment between the president and 
mayors does not seem to determine the distribution of the PJJH, 
mayoral control and leverage in their municipality does, providing 
a more nuanced picture of the alliances behind the distribution 
of this transfer. When mayors are reelected, no matter their party, 
they significantly increase their chances of getting the PJJH. The 
PJJH was a highly individualized program delivered to the unem-
ployed. Although during the first period of its assignment, the PJJH 
was widely publicized and there was a very short period to apply 
to obtain the benefits. In addition, once given the program, the 
chances of keeping it (or getting it on the condition that someone 
forfeits their spot) was highly related to closeness with the political 
networks, as well as to monitoring of workfare program benefi-
ciaries by the municipality or a social organization.  Regardless 
of their party, presidents reward reelected mayors when they can 
secure the distribution of the PJJH to build political support for the 
government. 
Political control variables are significant and negatively related 
to the odds of getting PJJH. However, the influences of malappor-
tionment, the effective number of parties, and the margin of victory 
were not significant in any case. Patterns of allocation do not seem 
to privilege alignment of presidents with mayors; there are gover-
nors who remain influential. But more importantly, regardless 
of whether mayors belong to the president’s party or not, when 
reelected they are rewarded for the control over their constituencies 
and they receive more workfare program funds.
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So far  we have considered how the choice of presidents’ allies at 
subnational levels affect the distribution of two different workfare 
programs. It has been demonstrated that both programs are used to 
cement alliances with governors and mayors. However, it is not poli-
tical alignment, but rather the mayors’ reelections, that explain why 
a municipality received the PJJH. This would lead us to conclude 
that governors are always preferred, but what are the prospects for 
these different alliances? With time, alignments with governors 
seem to lose some of their weight. If one considers how the odds 
of getting the programs vary with time, one can infer that there 
exists a trend toward the diversification of alliances, because the EH 
(delivered both to mayors and governors) gained more influence as 
the years went by during the period analyzed.
 PJJH began in 2002 and reached a huge number of beneficiaries 
in a short time. After 2011, however, it shrank and almost disa-
ppeared or was absorbed by other transfers, such as the Asignación 
Universal por Hijo (Bustos and Villafañe 2011). The EH followed the 
opposite pattern: after its outset, municipalities were more likely to 
get the EH and less likely to get the PJJH (the program preferred 
for exclusive alliances with governors). Each year shows that trans-
fers decreased after their outset (models 2-4); however, across the 
years, the decrease of PJJH is notably more important than the EH. 
Moreover, the EH increased in time, particularly when considering 
only the mayors’ party (model 1), regardless of alignment.
From all the political variables considered in model 4, political 
alignments between the president and governors and the reelection 
of mayors are markedly the most important when explaining why a 
municipality gets PJJH. Although the coefficient of mayors’ reelec-
tion is smaller, results are significant at p<0.01. When alignments 
are included (model 4), the log-odd ratio of population increases the 
chances of getting the PJJH from 8 to 64. This program thus seems 
to be useful to build support in populated metropolitan areas where 
bureaucratic networks of distributions are well settled and can reach 
people in greater numbers than in less populated districts. On the 
other hand, malapportionment of provinces, mainly experienced 
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by smaller districts where governors keep tight control on their 
politics and political networks, seems to have no influence on how 
presidents allocate  PJJH. 
Mayoral partisanship, independent of alliances across govern-
ment levels, was not a significant variable explaining the distribution 
of PJJH. Being a Peronist mayor doubled the chances of getting this 
program, but standard errors were high and the coefficient was not 
significant. When political coalitions are not considered, poverty 
is notably the most important and significant explanatory variable 
for odds of receiving resources from the PJJH in Argentine muni-
cipalities (model 3). Policy goals are met, as the PJJH is distributed 
in the poorer districts. When coalitions are excluded (model 3), 
poverty better explained PJJH distribution than any other variable. 
However, it is worth noting that when political alignments were 
included, the weight of poverty dropped dramatically, although 
poverty and unemployment remained significant and positively 
related to the allocation of the PJJH. Poorer districts had 360 times 
higher chances of getting the program (model 3); when alignments 
were included (model 4), these chances dropped down to 56. From 
the policy  point of view, the very high and significant coefficient of 
poverty suggests the high priority given to programmatic politics, 
provided alignments are excluded. 
Table 2 - Municipalities Receiving More Than One Single Federal Transfer
5 PJHH 6PJHH
Reelected Mayor -0.024458 0.0035485
(-0.0178) (-0.0181)
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Other Party Mayor 0.0228173
-
(-0.0449)
Provincial Party Mayor 0.1091328**
-
(-0.0458)
Peronist Party Mayor 0.0479764
-
(-0.0347)
UCR Party Mayor 0.123181***
-
(-0.0415)
Year 2003 0.6474523*** 0.6250105***
(-0.0254) (-0.0266)
Year 2004 0.5024792*** 0.4716642***
(-0.0278) (-0.0285)
Year 2005 0.2634062*** 0.22754***
(-0.0371) (-0.0380)
Year 2006 0.0374955 -0.0150493
(-0.0480) (-0.0483)
Year 2007 -0.147846*** -0.2114518***
(-0.0380) (-0.0386)
Year 2008 -0.4200559*** -0.5182637***
(-0.0454) (-0.0442)
Year 2009 -0.8500158*** -0.9849946***
(-0.0473) (-0.0460)


























Note: General Squares regression estimates for time-series cross-sectional panel data explaining federal transfers to municipalities 
by year. Dependent variable in models 5 and 6 measures the amount transferred (logged) for the workfare program Jefes y Jefas.  
Random effects by municipality. Standard errors in parentheses.
* = p value less/equal to 0,10.
** = p value less/equal to 0,05.
*** = p value less/equal to 0,01.
So far,  it has been analyzed which variables explain the chances 
of a municipality getting federal funds, but once a municipality is 
chosen and gets the funds, what are the determinants that explain 
why some of them receive more resources than others? Within 
the municipalities receiving PJJH transfers, a general least square 
regression model for a time-series cross-sectional dataset was speci-
fied to answer this question (model 5-6). 
 Once municipalities obtain the PJJH, different variables explain 
why some receive more than others. When considering political 
variables, the model assessing the mayors’ party (model 5) shows 
that opposition districts (whose mayor belongs to provincial parties 
or the UCR) receive more money than those belonging to the 
Peronist party and to the FPV. These results are consistent with the 
effect of alignments across government levels observed in model 
6. Full political alignment between the president, governors and 
mayors reduces significantly the amount of funds received. This 
result is counterintuitive. Presidents publicly demand support from 
governors for their policies and political projects; for this and other 
reasons one would expect governors’ loyalty. However, this does not 
seem to be the case. Full alignment means that presidents, gover-
nors and mayors belong to the PJ or the FPV (depending on the 
year of election). One possible explanation for this counterintuitive 
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pattern is that when the party controls both governorship and 
municipalities, it allows presidents to reallocate more resources to 
opposition (potentially swing) districts once a municipality already 
receives the PJJH. 
This finding is consistent with the fact that the alignment between 
mayors and governors, excluding the president, increases the trans-
fers received. This means that both mayors and governors do not 
belong to the president’s party. Therefore, PJ or FPV governorships 
do not receive more money. When governors are allies, opposition 
municipalities are chosen to deliver the PJJH. The overall picture 
suggests that once a municipality receives the PJJH, the decision 
of giving more money is related to governors’ control over their 
polities. If governors are not able to win certain municipalities 
managed by opposition mayors, presidents bypass governors, deli-
vering more PJJH money in order to increase their leverage in these 
districts. 
Both poverty and population significantly explain the chances of 
getting more resources from the PJJH. However, when alignments 
are included, a one-unit rise in the log of population predicts a 
16-45% rise in transfers. Poorer districts receive around 80-100% 
more resources independently of political alignments. Malappor-
tionment significantly reduces the money received by a municipa-
lity. Since malapportionment is also negatively related to population 
(over-represented districts are those with less population), this result 
is consistent with the positive effect that population has in model 6 
on the rise of the amount of PJJH received by municipalities.
These results show that partisanship and government level varia-
bles adopt different constellations of distributive politics that do 
not follow a unique pattern. Instead, they vary depending on the 
choices of federal coalitions and the features of the public policy 
used to cement them. Who presidential allies are (mayors or gover-
nors) explains the variation in the distribution of different funds, 
even when they belong to the same party. Beyond partisanship, 
territorial alignments must be considered in order to understand 
the equilibrium between programmatic and tactical distribution. 
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Final remarks
Presidents have access to resources that they can allocate with 
discretion, and they do not allocate them uniformly to all provinces 
and to all municipalities within them. Given that provincial gover-
nors are the presidents’ main partners in federal countries and also 
that municipalities are subordinated to provinces, it was explored 
whether mayors also matter to explain this difference in distribu-
tion when the president allocates resources at the municipal level.  
Political processes at the municipal level matter to federal demo-
cracies. Presidents seek mayors’ collaboration in order to build 
support, recruit candidates, and deliver policies countrywide. Diffe-
rent practices of coalition-building with governors and mayors 
coexist as presidents have resources to keep both alliances and, 
particularly, because presidents need mayoral coalitions. This does 
not mean a zero-sum game with the intervention of the president in 
subnational politics weakening the power of governors. However, 
the coexistence of these federal coalitions does affect patterns of 
distribution.
For presidents, mayors’ control of local politics allows them to 
address people on an individual basis, deliver federal policies, and 
collect votes for elections. High levels of fiscal imbalance make 
federal resources valuable for both governors and mayors. Even 
those with alternative sources of public resources understand that it 
is advantageous to be involved in agreements with the president for 
the purpose of exchanging political outcomes for federal policies 
and/or revenues. For governors, it is more profitable to receive 
money from the federal government than to raise taxes. For mayors, 
federal resources are an alternative to income from provinces and 
local taxes. 
 It can be verified by this article that presidents can rely simulta-
neously on both governors and mayors. In order to collect votes in 
their bureaucratic and partisan networks, both mobilize citizens to 
rally support and deliver national policies. It was demonstrated that 
presidents can simultaneously gain support from governors and 
mayors – as well as their bureaucratic and partisan networks – to 
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collect votes, mobilize citizens in their favor, and deliver national 
policies.
The second finding is that the president uses specific policy 
tools for these collaborations, usually cemented with resources that 
presidents can deliver with discretion such as workfare or housing 
programs. The match between each resource and each subnational 
partner gives rise to different distributive patterns that help presi-
dents fuel the provincial and municipal machines that guarantee 
political support and bureaucratic collaboration at the subnational 
level. For instance, in some cases it is not partisan alignment with 
mayors, but rather mayors’ reelection, that explains distribution. 
In the abundant studies on federalism, coalitions (or opposition) 
between governors and presidents are the best predictor for the 
eligibility of a municipality to receive federal rents. If one zoom 
into alliances, one can see that mayors are also important, but for 
different reasons. For instance, since housing programs are visible 
at the provincial level, they help governors to seek voters’ support. 
The results of this paper show that mayors are also important for a 
municipality to receive resources from federal housing programs, 
although their influence is weaker. 
Why do both matter? Houses are built by cooperatives of bene-
ficiaries of social programs, and municipalities receive money for 
materials from the federal government and later distribute it. Both 
requirements make mayors important players for the identification 
of cooperative members and for the administration of the program. 
In the case of the workfare program, results show two counterintui-
tive findings. First, its individualized nature would lead us to guess 
that mayors are crucial for delivery. However, governors are more 
influential than mayors in getting this program. This first finding 
leads us to the second: full alignment among mayors, presidents 
and governors reduces the amount of money received. The workfare 
program is so important in collecting votes that presidents choose to 
bypass allied governors  to reach opposition municipalities because 
governors were unable to win these districts. In these cases it is the 
reelection of mayors that explains distribution. 
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This work provides evidence of the coexistence between different 
federal coalitions and their influence in distributive politics. Of 
course, neither partisan alignments nor party labels at the time 
of election capture the variation of alliances within parties over 
time. Further research is needed to address this variation and its 
impact on distributive politics with different proxies of federal 
coalitions. In addition, case studies would give us a deeper unders-
tanding of the timing of distribution and the relative weight of 
agreements with both governors and mayors when they coexist. In 
any case, results show that programmatic and distributive politics 
explain which municipalities are chosen and how much money is 
delivered to them. Along with federal coalitions, social variables 
explain patterns of distribution, suggesting that the use of income 
support transfers to allied mayors does not hinder the achievement 
of policy goals. Since there are more potential beneficiaries than 
public resources available within eligible districts, coalitions explain 
distribution. This equilibrium between programmatic and political 
distribution varies depending on presidential partners and the 
type of goods delivered. This variation should be studied in depth; 
in developing countries, it is at the heart of the state’s success to 
respond to the basic needs of citizens. 
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Appendix A
Variable Definition Source
Got PJJH (Dependent 
variable in models 3 and 4)
Got PJJH is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a muni-
cipality in a particular year obtains a transfer from the Jefes y Jefas 
de Hogar program (Household Heads Program) and 0 otherwise.
Sub Secretary of Employment 
of the Ministry of Labor
Got EH (Dependent variable 
in models 1 and 2)
Got EH is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 
if a municipality in a particular year gets a transfer from 
the Programa de Emergencia Habitacional (Federal 
Housing Emergency Program) and 0otherwise 
Sub secretary of Urban 
Development and Housing of 
the Ministry of Federal Planning, 
Public Investment and Services.
LPJJH (Dependent Variable 
in Models 5 and 6)
A federal workfare programs given to each 
municipality each year, logged
Sub Secretary of Employment 
of the Ministry of Labor.
Reelected Mayor
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if a 
mayor has been reelected or otherwise 0
Ministry of Interior




Percentage of people with basic unsatisfied needs (NBI) by 
municipality in 2001, for last available census data 2001, logged  
National Institute of Statistics 
and 2001 Census (INDEC)
Population Number of people living in each municipality in 2001, logged.
National Institute of Statistics 
and 2001 Census (INDEC)
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Provincial party mayor
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the ma-
yor belongs to a provincial party or otherwise 0
electoral alliance which has only run at provincial level, 0 otherwise
Ministry of Interior
Peronist party mayor
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the ma-
yor belongs to the Peronist party or otherwise 0
Ministry of Interior
UCR party mayor
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the mayor 
belongs to the Union Cívica Radical Party (UCR) or otherwise 0
Ministry of Interior
Mayor aligned with 
the Governor
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the mayor 
and governors belong to the same party or otherwise 0
Ministry of Interior
Mayor aligned with 
the President
A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the mayor 




A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the governor 
and president belong to the same party or 0 otherwise
Ministry of Interior
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Coef. Var.
(log) EH 15503 95012 353566 0 9392745 3.721
(log) PJJH 17720 2054297 2735651 0 9998843 1.332
(log) Population 16449 6022952 2864254 5826 9990078 0.476
Poverty (lagged) 16672 5102505 2375904 0 9995656 0.466
Reelected Mayor 16931 0.511 0.500 0 1 0.978
Mayor aligned with 
the governor
17720 0.316 0.465 0 1 1.470
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Mayor aligned with 
the president
17720 0.478 0.500 0 1 1.045
Full alignment 17720 0.266 0.442 0 1 1.660
Governor aligned with 
the president
17720 0.455 0.498 0 1 1.095
Got PJJH (dummy) 17720 0.913 0.282 0 1 0.310
Got EH (dummy) 15503 0.077 0.266 0 1 3.468
Margin of victory 17720 17.325 17.433 0.78 84.54 1.006
Effective Number of Parties 17720 2.579 0.658 1.22 4.45 0.255
Malapportionment 17712 -0.157 0.434 -0.791 1.744 -2.763
Abstract
Governors and mayors contribute with necessary political inputs to federal 
politics, and the president may have no incentive or choice to exclude any 
of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute 
with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences 
in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as different 
municipalities within them. The objective of this paper is to explain these 
differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where 
municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass 
governors. Transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels will be 
explored in order to show that partisan alignments between mayors and 
presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up 
for reelection) can be analyzed to explain differences in funding levels.
The new generation of studies on federalism focuses on different 
variables, beyond the functioning of formal institutions. Within these 
variables, the role of governors – namely the fact that they are powerful 
and important to presidents – has been widely documented by scholarly 
research. However, the role of mayors has been less thoroughly explored. 
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To generate evidence on how both governors and mayors are important 
to presidents, it was built an original database that, for the first time, 
studied distribution in all Argentine municipalities for a period of eight 
years (2002-2009) to help fill this vacuum.
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